Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) BillGovernment Bill 187—1
Explanatory noteGeneral policy statement
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Climate change, and how we deal with it, is one of the most important issues of our time. The introduction of this Bill is a critical step toward New Zealand playing its part to address climate change. The Bill’s principal purpose is to amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to introduce a greenhouse gas Emissions Trading Scheme in New Zealand (NZ ETS). The Bill also amends the Electricity Act 1992 to create a preference for renewable electricity generation by implementing a moratorium on new fossil-fuelled thermal electricity generation, except to the extent necessary to ensure the security of New Zealand’s electricity supply. Emissions trading schemes are increasingly being established in a number of countries and regions around the globe. Over time, the NZ ETS will cover all gases and all sectors, in order to minimise overall costs to the economy and operate with efficiency and equity. The scheme will apply an economy-wide price signal to activities that contribute to climate change. Climate change is a global problem and New Zealand is reliant on international action to mitigate the risks associated with increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The design of the NZ ETS is compatible with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Convention) and the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol), but is designed to endure under a range of possible future scenarios for international climate change agreements. The objective that guided the design of the NZ ETS is: That a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme support and encourage global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by:
while maintaining economic flexibility, equity, and environmental integrity at least cost in the long term. The NZ ETS is designed to operate as an integral part of the government’s broader climate change, sustainable development, and economic transformation agendas. The preference for renewable electricity generation augments the NZ ETS goal of reducing New Zealand’s net greenhouse gas emissions below business-as-usual levels. It does this by implementing a moratorium on investment in new fossil-fuelled thermal generation, except to the extent required to ensure security of supply. This will reduce the potential for fossil-fuelled thermal electricity generation to increase the level of New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions. The NZ ETS and the renewable generation preference are part of New Zealand’s wider effort to meet its international commitments under the Convention and Protocol to implement policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Consultation and Engagement ProcessThis Bill was developed after an extensive process of consultation and engagement. In December 2006, the government released five energy and climate change discussion documents, and embarked on a significant consultation process on a number of policy options. The high level of public engagement and feedback showed that New Zealanders take energy and land use sustainability seriously, and are keen to be part of the solution. Over 3 000 submissions were received and over 150 public meetings and hui with Māori held. Following this consultation, the government established a cross-departmental Emissions Trading Group (ETG) to develop a proposal for an NZ ETS. The ETG includes representatives from the Treasury and the following agencies: Ministry for the Environment, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The ETG also works closely with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Te Puni Kōkiri, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Conservation, the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, and the Inland Revenue Department. On 20 September 2007, the government released its proposal for an NZ ETS, and began an intensive period of engagement on the core design features, and with particular regard to Māori and to those sectors entering the scheme first (forestry and liquid fossil fuels). The engagement also included the establishment of a Climate Change Leadership Forum, to facilitate communication between the government and the broader community on the proposed design of the NZ ETS. The Forum will continue until mid-2008 and its considerations will be taken into account through the legislative process. Issues that are likely to be discussed include the treatment of pre-1990 forests, the type of emission units allowed into the NZ ETS, phase-out of free allocation, and whether an intensity-based approach can be included within an absolute cap of free allocation. Engagement process will continue throughout 2008, including on those aspects of the NZ ETS that are to be governed by regulations. A number of mechanisms are in place to achieve robust input, including technical advisory groups for energy and industry, and agriculture. A In the longer term, the government will continue to engage with the broader community on the future evolution of the NZ ETS in light of changes to New Zealand’s obligations under international climate change agreements. The Bill provides a process for review of the NZ ETS, prior to the end of the Protocol’s first commitment period and each subsequent commitment period. In October 2007, the government released the New Zealand Energy Strategy (NZES) and adopted a target for renewable electricity generation of 90% by 2025. Consistent with this, the NZES states a clear preference that all new electricity generation be renewable, except to the extent necessary to maintain security of supply. The NZES signalled consideration of regulatory options under the Electricity Act 1992 to support this objective. The development of the NZES involved a large number of organisations, associations, interest groups and individuals offering comment on the ideas and options contained in the strategy. Structure of the BillPart 1Part 1 of the Bill contains amendments to the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to introduce the NZ ETS. Clause 4 of the Bill sets out the dates from which certain provisions of the Climate Change Response Act 2002, once amended, will apply. Individuals and firms within different sectors will first assume NZ ETS obligations from the date when the relevant parts of Schedules 3 and 4 apply. The entry of sectors into the NZ ETS is based on sectors’ preparedness for trading, administrative feasibility and consideration of price effects through the economy. The table below reports when each sector first assumes obligations and first must comply with those obligations under the NZ ETS. Subsequent compliance periods for each sector extend from 1 January to 31 December in each calendar year. Staged entry of sectors into the NZ ETS
By 2013, all sectors and all six major greenhouse gases will be covered by the NZ ETS, so that all major sectors of the New Zealand economy will be exposed to the international price of emissions, at the margin, for all operations. The existing provisions in Part 2 of the Climate Change Response Act relating to the Crown’s trading in Kyoto units are amended to allow for the introduction of the NZ ETS. These amendments are mostly contained in clauses 6 to 28 of the Bill. The core provisions that implement the NZ ETS are contained in a new Part 4 of the Climate Change Response Act 2002, inserted by clause 43. Part 4 covers participants, participants’ obligations, allocation of New Zealand units, compliance and enforcement, offences and penalties, review and appeals, future development and Ministerial review of the scheme. The NZ ETS is based on the concept that The NZ ETS reduces compliance costs by ensuring that the activities giving rise to obligations are as high in the supply chain as possible. The activities that bring a participant into the NZ ETS are listed in new Schedules 3 and 4. Where possible, Activities listed in Schedule 3 are those activities undertaken in New Zealand that will automatically give rise to obligations under the NZ ETS—a person who does one of these activities must register as a participant under the scheme and comply with their obligations in respect of that activity. Although some sectors will not be brought into the NZ ETS for some years, the Bill contains the activities for all sectors. The dates are included now to give certainty to the Persons can also elect to become participants if they do activities listed in Schedule 4. Schedule 4 covers:
There are likely to be less than 200 participants in the NZ ETS not including those in the forestry sector. The number of forestry participants could range from 2 000 to 9 000, depending on the number of post-1989 forest owners or forestry right/lease holders who decide to become participants in the scheme. The main obligation that participants will have under the NZ ETS is to surrender emission units to match the emissions from their activities in each annual compliance period. Participants are also obliged to:
The methodologies prescribed in regulations will include formulas to calculate emissions, such as scientifically-determined factors that relate activities to emissions (eg, the quantity of carbon dioxide emitted when a litre of fuel is burned). They will also include methods for measuring activities directly or indirectly resulting in emissions. Participants undertaking The primary unit of trade in the NZ ETS is a New Zealand unit (NZU), issued by the government. For the first commitment period of the Protocol (2008–2012), each NZU issued by the government will be backed by a Kyoto unit held in a Crown holding account in the Registry. Participants may surrender Kyoto units to meet their NZ ETS obligations (subject to some restrictions). Kyoto units can be acquired overseas or domestically. The Bill itself does not contain a provision to limit the volume of Kyoto units that can enter the NZ ETS, but gives the responsible Minister the ability to place restrictions on which classes or subclasses of Kyoto units may enter the NZ ETS and what transactions may or may not be registered in respect of those units. The government has already decided to exclude certain units (eg, Certified Emission Reduction units from nuclear projects). The government is still seeking feedback on the need for other restrictions. The Bill places no restriction on the entry of AAUs into the NZ ETS; this has been welcomed by some and criticised by other domestic stakeholders, who have expressed concerns about potentially damaging the integrity of the NZ ETS, and reducing New Zealand’s prospects of linking with other countries’ schemes. Consideration of these views needs to be weighed against the costs of compliance without AAUs entering the NZ ETS and recognition of the fact that all Parties have agreed to the provisions of the Protocol. Maintaining the spirit of the Protocol is critical to negotiating future inclusive agreements. The amendments to Part 2 of the principal Act are designed to permit bilateral linkages with other countries’ domestic trading schemes in the future. In terms of trading, the NZ ETS is designed to allow flexibility in how participants trade units in the market, whether trading occurs via trading platforms, or via direct exchange. Any person eligible to open a holding account in the Registry (not just participants) will be able to hold and trade emission units). Subpart 2 of new Part 4 contains provisions for the free allocation of emission units to the forestry, and to trade-exposed industry and agriculture sectors. New section 69 establishes the level of allocation to pre-1990 forest land owners at 55 million New Zealand units. The treatment of pre-1990 forests relative to post-1989 forests (particularly the free allocation of emission units equivalent to 55 million tonnes of emissions to owners of pre-1990 forests) has been criticised by elements of the forestry industry. Further advice is being prepared for Ministers on options for targeting of free allocation for pre-1990 exotic forests, such as on the basis of restrictions on land-use change since 2002 (when the government first signalled there would obligations associated with deforestation). Electricity generators and liquid fossil fuel providers are not likely to suffer major (negative) impacts on their profitability through the introduction of the NZ ETS, as they are likely to pass on any extra costs imposed by an ETS to consumers down the supply chain. Consequently, they will not receive transitional assistance. The approach to assistance to industry and agriculture (sections 70 and 71) is to limit the total level of assistance to be provided by firstly identifying the initial level of assistance to be provided, and secondly, by defining the way forward (including phase-out of assistance by 2025):
The government is continuing to engage with sectors on allocation plans and the emission abatement paths. This will occur via the Climate Change Leadership Forum, the Māori Leadership and Reference Groups, the Peak Group, and the Technical Advisory Groups. New section 68 provides for the making of allocation plans by Order in Council. The plans will set out a maximum free allocation for each sector over 2008–2012 and 2013–2025 and specify who is eligible for a free allocation of NZUs. Sections 72 and 73 contain the process to govern the making of allocation plans. Before recommending that an Order be made to issue an allocation plan, the Minister must notify his or her intention to make the allocation plan, gather information from people who may be eligible for an allocation of NZUs, and seek public submissions on the draft plan. Provisions dealing with compliance and enforcement are in Subparts 3 to 5 of new Part 4. The NZ ETS follows a self-assessment model. Under this approach, all the obligations placed on participants are clearly set out in legislation. Participants are required to submit annual emissions returns. Since this information will be of a commercial nature it will not be publicly available; nonetheless, certain information will be disclosed in aggregated form. The government is engaging on whether firms would be willing to report more frequently. The chief executive will have the ability to audit the compliance of emissions returns submitted by participants. If participants fail to meet their obligations, or are shown to have failed to comply following an audit, financial and make-good penalties will apply, and will increase with the degree of culpability. To aid compliance, the chief executive will be able to issue advance rulings (called Ministers and departmental chief executives are the principal decision-makers under the NZ ETS. The Bill creates the right to seek District Court review of decisions. Appeals on questions of law will lie with the High Court. New Part 5 of the Climate Change Response Act 2002 contains the provisions specific to the forestry, transport and stationary energy sectors. The forestry-specific provisions in Subpart 1 of Part 5 cover:
The transport-specific provisions (Subpart 2 of Part 5) cover the ability of major jet fuel users to assume obligations under the NZ ETS if they wish. The stationary energy-specific provisions (Subpart 3 of Part 5) mirror these provisions in respect of major coal and gas users. Part 1 of the Bill also provides for the consequential amendments that are required to ensure other statutes are consistent with, and support, the introduction of the NZ ETS. The Income Tax Act 2004 and the Income Tax Act 2007 are amended to provide for the taxation treatment of the forestry sector of the NZ ETS. Provisions relating to the tax treatment of the NZ ETS for other sectors will be included in a tax bill scheduled to be introduced in early 2008. The Forests Act 1949 is amended to provide for the potential use under that Act of verifiers recognised under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 and methodologies prescribed under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 (as provided for in this Bill). The Forestry Rights Registration Act 1983 is amended to remove certain definitions that are superseded by definitions in this Bill. The Personal Property Securities Act 1999 is also amended to allow security interests over emission units to be registered in the Personal Property Securities Register. RegulationsThe principal features of the NZ ETS, including obligations on participants, are provided for in primary legislation. Regulations (as provided for in new section 148) will supply further technical details. The areas that will be covered by regulations include:
Part 2Part 2 of the Bill amends the Electricity Act 1992 to create a preference for renewable electricity generation by implementing a moratorium on new fossil-fuelled electricity generation, except to the extent necessary to ensure the security of New Zealand’s electricity supply. To help meet the government’s climate change objectives, the New Zealand Energy Strategy (NZES) contains a target for 90% renewable electricity generation by 2025, and states a clear preference that all new electricity generation be renewable, except to the extent necessary to maintain security of supply. Modelling undertaken to support the NZES indicates that renewable generation is expected to be cost competitive with fossil-fuelled thermal generation, particularly under the range of potential carbon prices envisioned under the NZ ETS. It is feasible, however, that a combination of factors, such as a high exchange rate and low gas price (as could arise from a major gas discovery) could mean that, even with emissions pricing, fossil-fuelled thermal generation may become more economic. Unexpected high costs or other barriers to new renewables could also make fossil-fuelled thermal generation more economic. Due to the economies of scale involved in electricity generation investment, any significant investment in fossil-fuelled generation could To minimise these risks, this Bill implements a 10-year legislative moratorium on new fossil-fuelled thermal baseload generation. This moratorium applies equally to all generators, whether state-owned or private, thereby ensuring competitive neutrality between generators with regard to the type of investments they can undertake. It is designed to influence generators’ investment decisions towards renewables in the short-term, allowing time for the full introduction of an emissions price via the NZ ETS, which will influence investment decisions over the longer term. Part 2 of the Bill inserts a new Part 6A into the Electricity Act 1992 providing for a 10-year moratorium on new fossil-fuelled thermal generation. The moratorium will apply to all fossil-fuelled generation greater than 10MW in capacity. Nevertheless, because a moratorium on new baseload fossil-fuelled generation has the potential to adversely affect security of supply, the Bill provides for exemptions for specific fossil-fuelled generation proposals that address concerns over security of supply. Applications for exemptions from the moratorium will be judged against a set of criteria aimed at addressing concerns over security of supply. Exemptions will be granted by the Minister of Energy on the recommendation of the Electricity Commission. Clause by clause analysisClause 1 relates to the Title. Clause 2 relates to commencement. Part 1 |
| Sector | Commencement of obligations | End of initial compliance period | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Forestry (includes deforestation of pre-1990 land and afforestation post-1989 | 1 January 2008 | 31 December 2009 (first compliance period is 2 years) | |
| Liquid fossil fuels | 1 January 2009 | 31 December 2009 | |
| Stationary energy (includes coal, natural gas, and geothermal) | 1 January 2010 | 31 December 2010 | |
| Industrial process (non-energy) emissions | 1 January 2010 | 31 December 2010 | |
| Agriculture (includes pastoral and arable farming and horticulture) | 1 January 2013 | 31 December 2013 | |
| Waste | 1 January 2013 | 31 December 2013 | |
| All other emissions | 1 January 2013 | 31 December 2013 |
In each sector, there are a range of options for where to place the point of obligation. Points of obligations are designed to:
(a) Keep compliance and administration costs low.
(b) Capture as many of sectors’ emissions as practicable.
(c) Reflect the feasibility of monitoring and verifying emissions at each point.
(d) Create appropriate incentives to reduce emissions while not unduly deterring worthwhile economic activity and investment.
The fundamental impact of an ETS is that it changes prices in the economy to reflect the cost of emissions. Price changes will incentivise abatement activity, which should see net emissions reducing from business as usual. Given the stringency of the Kyoto agreement, the overall macro impacts on the economy will be small over 2008–2012 . However the impacts on particular sectors of the economy (ie, the microeconomic effects) could be more significant due to emissions being concentrated around certain activities and sectors. To give a sense of magnitude, some indicative price changes are shown in the table below. These assume no assistance or compensation has been provided. These changes would be the same under a carbon tax set at the corresponding emission price.
The Emissions Trading Group (ETG) commissioned economic consultants Infometrics to update their previous analysis of the effect of various policy instruments on the New Zealand economy.
The macroeconomic impact, as represented by a variety of indicators is very small. This is consistent with the previous message that the impact under Kyoto would be around 0.1 percent of GDP. It should be noted that New Zealand faces an impact, regardless of having an ETS as we have already signed up to Kyoto. In fact, under an ETS New Zealand’s net emissions should reduce; this will work to further reduce the macroeconomic impacts over the status quo.
Infometrics has pointed out that GDP is not a particularly good indicator of welfare or living standards. In fact, its modelling of the ETS indicates the impact on GDP would be zero, however, this would be a misleading figure to use, because there will be a real reduction (albeit small) in living standards as measured by the level of private consumption.
The macroeconomic impact over the Kyoto period is small because:
(a) The “shock”
to the economy of introducing an emission price into the economy is small compared to the size of the economy. In any case, this “shock”
involves a transfer of resources within the economy from taxpayers to sectors that produce emissions. This transfer of resources does not represent a loss to the economy as a whole.
(b) The resources that are required to pay for the emission units that must be purchased offshore (as a result of the country having a net emissions deficit) do represent a loss to the economy. However, under Kyoto the country’s net position is small compared to the size of the economy. Given the assumptions behind the model, this loss does not actually cause a reduction in GDP (in world prices), as the volume of goods and services produced by NZ does not change. It is simply that more resources need to go into exporting, leaving less for private consumption. The reduction in private consumption does represent a reduction in living standards relative to business as usual.
The longer term impacts of an ETS will be driven by the stringency of international agreements going forward. As international agreements become more stringent , the impacts will increase. However, these could be moderated by technology improvements and by the degree to which international agreements become more comprehensive (ie, the degree to which imbalances in global competitiveness between firms can be reduced).
Modelling in 2025 under a range of different scenarios was carried out by Infometrics to give insights into the potential impacts over the longer term. The modelling shows that the impact on the NZ economy would increase if international agreements become more stringent and the price of emissions rises. Given a range of speculative but plausible scenarios, the impact is still not large when compared to the underlying growth in living standards expected over time (eg, we might have living standards in 2030 that we would otherwise have expected in 2028 or 2029). The modelling has also shown how:
(a) An ETS reduces the impact of meeting our international obligations over the case where the government remains responsible for all emissions. For example private consumption fell by 1.0 percent in a scenario where the government is responsible but only 0.7 percent under an ETS.
(b) Stringency of international agreements (ie, how many emission units NZ gets allocated for free) is a key driver to the size of the impact.
(c) The coverage and nature of international agreements is very important. For example a scenario with key international trade prices reflecting the price of emissions (ie, if our international competitors also faced a price of emission) reduces the impacts.
ETG commissioned two reports from Point Carbon, a world-leading provider of independent analysis on carbon markets based in Norway:
(a) Issues in the International Carbon Market 2008–2012 and Beyond
(b) Functionality in the International Carbon Reduction Project.
Issues in the International Carbon Market 2008–2012 and Beyond covers price ranges in the international emissions trading market price risk management tools and the relationship between transaction costs and size of participants. The key points that arise from this report are:
(a) There is a range of prices in the international carbon market. These vary by risk of project and type of unit—Kyoto credits range between NZ $10 and $33.
(b) Uncertainties exist in the carbon market going forward. A major source of that uncertainty surrounds the prospect of assigned amount units (AAUs) entering the market.
(c) It is not yet clear how the AAU market will evolve but it is possible this will involve occasional, large volume intergovernmental transactions rather than a more liquid market with many private sector participants. The first intergovernmental transaction is expected in 2008.
(d) Prices in the secondary Certified Emission Reduction (CER) market (units with guaranteed delivery from the Clean Development Mechanism) are influenced by prices in the EU ETS. Yet, short-term volatility in the EU market does not affect the primary CER market.
(e) The international carbon market is evolving rapidly but is not yet as developed as other more established commodity markets. The emerging financial products and routes to the market are likely to increase the ability of participants to manage their exposure to price fluctuations in the carbon market.
(f) Although the growth of the financial services sector within the carbon market presents opportunities for smaller players to enter the carbon market, smaller players may be disadvantaged in terms of their ability to invest in the primary CER market, and in terms of brokerage and exchange fees.
Functionality in the International Carbon Reduction Project Market report covers issues related to the carbon market offset project market such as additionality, incentives to own high quality units, and validation processes. Key points arising from this report are:
(a) It is impossible to be definitive about the environmental veracity of processes such as the Clean Development Mechanism. The nature of the mechanism, especially the need for an additionality criterion, is such that environmental integrity cannot always be guaranteed.
(b) The tendency is for increasingly stringent rules and probity checks and it is expected that processes will continue to improve.
(c) There is evidence that buyers are exerting some control over the quality of the credits that they own.
(d) In the secondary CER market, it is not possible to identify the type of project that the credit originated from (eg, it is possible that credits associated with HFC-23 credits may be resold without being identified as such).
Most New Zealand firms will face costs and benefits under the ETS. Increased costs will occur under an ETS as a result of firms being required to surrender New Zealand Units (NZUs) to cover their emissions, or due to them facing higher energy and fuel prices. Many firms will be able to pass a portion of these costs down the supply chain, reducing the impact on their profitability. However, some firms will not be able to pass costs on, resulting in greater profit impact and a loss of competitiveness. The loss of competitiveness would be exacerbated if these firms competed with overseas firms that were not subject to the same price for emissions.
These impacts could be significant for some firms. In particular this disproportionate impact raises equity concerns. But most importantly it may also lead to long term regrets if the ETS resulted in reduced output, or closure of a firm, that would have been competitive if its competitors faced similar greenhouse gas measures and there were a good chance that these competitors will face such a charge in the foreseeable future. There would also be a concern if particularly large or concentrated job losses resulted or New Zealand’s reputation as a good place to do business relative to its neighbours and trading was damaged.
For these reasons, the government is proposing an industry assistance package. The exact shape and nature of this package is the subject of engagement between industry and government. This assistance could be in the form of free allocation (where the government gives free units to firms) and/or some form of progressive obligation where the obligation to surrender units gradually increases through time.
Direct emission reductions from New Zealand industry over the next 10–15 years under an ETS will be somewhat constrained by the nature of the existing facilities, although there are still promising opportunities to reduce emissions. These include:
(a) Switching from using coal to using gas or biomass for industrial heat wherever possible.
(b) Increasing the use of cogeneration in conjunction with industrial heat production (cogeneration technology allows heat that is generated for industrial processes to be used to produce electricity as well).
Over the longer term, there are many new technologies that could allow for dramatic improvements in industrial energy efficiency and emission reductions. The actual level of emission reductions will be determined by the price of emissions relative to the cost of the abatement activities.
Households will face higher energy prices (eg, petrol and electricity). The government is particularly concerned about impacts of electricity price increases on consumers and is considering compensation outside of the ETS.
There will be relatively small emission reductions, relative to business as usual, in the transport sector as consumption does not change much when the price rises. In fact, transport emissions are still expected to rise significantly over the long term (with key drivers being GDP and population growth). Pricing emissions will improve the cost effectiveness of new technologies for emission reduction to make them more widely available (and thus make them economic sooner than would have been the case).
Emissions from the electricity sector will not decrease in the short term, but in the medium to longer term there should be significant emission reductions relative to business as usual. This occurs as old thermal plant is replaced by plant with lower emissions (in particular new renewable generation capacity). Emission reductions would not be materially effected by compensation offered to consumers outside of the ETS, as generators will still face the correct price signals when building new plant.
This sector is a priority for the government as the sector can be a significant driver behind NZ net total emissions (both in a positive and negative sense). There are both benefits and costs for participants to be in the NZ ETS. Significant emissions could occur if this sector does not face the correct price signals for their deforestation of pre-1990 forests. On the other hand, the reduction of deforestation is likely to be one of the lower cost abatement options in the domestic economy in CP1.
It is currently estimated that for every 12 months that deforestation remains outside the ETS after 1 January 2008, increased emissions of 12-24Mt CO2-e are likely to occur, resulting in increased costs to the Crown of $180–$600 m. This reflects an assumption that owners would bring forward deforestation to avoid likely future controls. Current analysis suggests that deforestation would reduce substantially, and in many cases stop entirely, if the parties faced the full cost of the emissions involved.
Thus there will be compulsory entry for pre-1990 forests, but with a threshold to avoid high transaction costs. Yet the ETS will be voluntary for post 1990 forest. That is, the owners of these forests will be given the choice to enter the ETS and receive all of the relevant sink credits and future liabilities. This is expected to be more attractive for most investors than the existing (and ongoing) Permanent Forest Sinks Initiative (PFSI), because of restrictions under that initiative (although officials understand that these restrictions are seen by some investors as adding value).
Agricultural sector emissions represent almost half of New Zealand’s total GHG emissions and are currently a significant source of emissions growth. Any ETS that did not include agriculture emissions would be inconsistent with a least-cost approach to emissions reduction, as the cost of these emissions would need to be absorbed elsewhere in the economy. This makes agriculture a priority for inclusion in the ETS. It is also important that the sector faces the full marginal price of emissions as the current growth in emissions is largely driven by conversion and intensification. These decisions would be influenced by facing the full marginal price of emissions.
The effects of the ETS on the agriculture sector are difficult to accurately predict for a number of reasons. Firstly, the government is signalling a preference for a processor/company level point of obligation, in which case the price signals reaching farmers will likely be weak or distorted in some cases. Secondly, the agriculture sector is highly dynamic due to the ability for some farmers to readily change land use, the cyclical nature of commodity prices, and the apparent resilience of farm businesses and their ability to adapt to new conditions.
In the short term, it is unlikely to expect strong emission reductions from the agricultural sector as current opportunities for abatement are limited, particularly around methane, which represents about two-thirds of agriculture’s emissions. However, some opportunities exist around nitrogen inhibitors. In fact, it appears likely that aggregate emissions from agriculture (and from the dairy sector in particular) will rise in the near term at least. The dairy industry would be taking into account the price of emissions when decisions are made that result in increases in emissions.
The farming sector is characterised by a large number of sellers producing relatively homogenous and perishable product, meaning that farmers are also price takers. All costs introduced into the agriculture value chain (eg, CO2 related costs introduced at the processor level) are generally absorbed at the farm level. Introducing emissions trading in this sector may, therefore, have significant impacts on farm profitability and raise equity concerns at the farm level. In recognition of equity concerns, the government is proposing to use allocation policy to partially compensate farmers for lost profits.
There are over 30 000 pastoral farmers in NZ and many potential difficulties in bringing them into an ETS. Further engagement with the sector is required before the details of the scheme are finalised, and various mechanisms have been put in place for this (eg, Peak Group on Agriculture and the ETS).
While the ETS will operate as a new set of regulations that apply to GHG emissions, officials have designed a scheme that, to the greatest extent possible, utilises existing legislation and regulations.
The existence of an ETS will mean that some interventions that have been discussed in consultation documents to reduce emissions will no longer be required (eg, RMA standards on land use/deforestation, and nitrogen tax).
High levels of volatility in the price of emissions result in increased uncertainty (and thus cost) for business.
The NZ government will play an active role in international agreements to help ensure that the global carbon market develops in an orderly manner.
Enable the development of financial instruments to allow firms to reduce their exposure to the volatility in the price of emissions.
Consider measures to reduce the initial volatility that may be present during the establishment of a new market.
Ensure as much liquidity as possible by linking to international markets.
Consider the effects of government allocation decisions on market volatility.
There is a gap in international agreements after 2012.
The NZ government will actively participant in international negotiations with a view to reaching international agreement on arrangements post-2012.
Ensure flexibility in the design so that the operation of the scheme is not directly linked to any particular international agreement and can operate as a stand alone scheme if needed.
Need to ensure adequate liquidity in the case of a stand alone scheme or maybe look at a price cap or floor.
Potential for market failure in certain sectors resulting in less emission reduction occurring then should given the price.
Complementary measures (eg, energy efficient homes) can be targeted at areas where the price signal does not achieve the desired level of emission reduction.
Businesses have difficulty accessing the market.
Ensure that the registry is “business friendly”
including low transaction fees.
Enable competition between a range of emission markets both within NZ and overseas (as a result of the scheme being internationally linked).
Consider the nature of the firm when setting points of obligation (eg, large firms, who have established trading desks should find it easier to participate in the market then a Small to Medium Business).
The international price of emissions rises to very high levels causing significant harm to NZ economy.
Governments will need to make ongoing decisions about what further international commitments NZ is prepared to sign up to post-2012, including the stringency of emission reductions. New Zealand’s position on this could consider factors such as the extent and nature of participation by other countries.
Transitioning to the new regime will be difficult and/or expensive.
Have a transitional period and different dates of entry to recognise different levels of readiness.
Increased uncertainty and market volatility during the start up phase of the scheme.
Signal policies in advance as much as practical.
Education and training for participants.
Link to international markets to increase market liquidity.
Loss of firms with long term regrets.
Government will look to provide an industry assistance package to reduce risk of firms shifting operations offshore as a result of the ETS.
Future international agreements are based around a carbon tax.
Ensure the ETS is easily modified to act as a tax (this would simply require the govt to provide unlimited units at a particular price—points of obligation, reporting and monitoring etc, could remain unchanged) if this becomes necessary given global developments.
Establish a regular review process for the scheme to take into account international developments.
Future international agreements move towards an intensity base approach.
Ensure the ETS can easily be modified to adopt an intensity based approach.
Establish a regular review process for the scheme to take into account international developments.
Breach of commitment period reserve (a requirement under the Kyoto Protocol that all party nations retain at least 90% of their initial assigned amount of AAUs within their emissions unit register).
Breach is unlikely due to the expected net inflow of Kyoto units over CP1 and can be managed by allocation decisions and staggered sectoral entry into the NZ ETS.
Required systems, processes or the administering agency are not fully functioning by the commencement of the scheme.
Implementation is discussed in the section below.
The compliance and enforcement system for the NZ ETS is based on a “self-assessment”
methodology like that used in the New Zealand tax system. Under this system, ETS participants will be responsible for complying with their obligations under the ETS and assumed to be in compliance unless subsequently challenged by the chief executive of the department with responsibility for administration of the NZ ETS (“Chief Executive”
). This system should result in far lower compliance costs for both participants and for the Chief Executive than a full-regulation model and is consistent with the nature of the regulatory regime being imposed. In order to meet all the requirements of the compliance system, participants will need to undertake a number of activities including:
(a) surrender one emissions unit for each tonne of CO2-e emitted in each compliance period
(b) calculate their level of emissions using approved methodologies
(c) retain sufficient records to allow verification of emission calculations
(d) report their level of emissions, and emission units surrendered at the end of each compliance period, to the Chief Executive
(e) comply with any directions of the Chief Executive.
Participants’ emission levels will be determined by multiplying the volume of an emitting activity by an emissions factor in a particular time period. Emissions factors will be provided, or approved, by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive will be given adequate rights to check the validity of information provided to it. Any failure to meet the core obligation will result in:
(a) a requirement to make up the surrender shortfall within 90 days of a determination by the Chief Executive that a participant is in breach and at a ration of 1:1
(b) a financial penalty of NZ $30 per tonne of CO2-e emitted for which emission units have not been surrendered
(c) the publication of the participant’s identity and nature of the compliance failure.
Where a participant knowingly fails to meet the core obligation, the make-up requirement will increase to a ratio of 1:2. Also, the financial penalty will rise to NZ$60 per tonne of CO2-e emitted and participants will face the possibility of criminal conviction. Failure to meet other obligations (eg, the requirement to monitor and report emissions) will result in a financial penalty of up to $4,000 for the third infringement, $8,000 for the second, and $12,000 for the third. Where a participant fails to meet these obligations knowingly, it will be subject to larger fines and possibly criminal conviction. This penalty structure is similar to that imposed under the self-assessment approach in the Tax Administration Act 1994.
Generally, feedback on the compliance and enforcement provisions has been accepting of the self-assessment compliance system. It is expected that detailed submissions will be received during the Select Committee process. However, some changes are proposed now in order to assist the development of the New Zealand carbon market. The accompanying paper asks Cabinet to consider a revised approach for the requirements around the surrendering of units when sectors first enter the ETS, variants of which have arisen during the engagement process. The revised approach is (note, forestry and transport enter at point b):
(a) for firms to monitor and report their emissions for the year (two years for agriculture) prior to entry to the NZ ETS on a voluntary basis (penalties for errors in reporting in that year would not apply):
(b) for firms to monitor and report for their year of entry into the ETS (with reporting penalties applying) and to surrender units for that year (without applying penalties other than a make good provision for under-surrender of units):
(c) for firms to monitor, report and surrender units for subsequent years with the full penalty regime applying.
In addition, the government will make it clear that any changes to the rules on what units can be used for compliance purposes will not apply retrospectively.
It is proposed the legislation for the NZ ETS proceed as a new part of the Climate Change Response Act 2002. The Climate Change Response Act 2002 implements New Zealand’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to establish a national registry system. Many of the features for a New Zealand ETS already exist under the Climate Change Response Act 2002, although some require modification. The purpose of the Climate Change Response Act 2002 will also need to be amended to provide for a New Zealand ETS that continues beyond 2012. The bill to amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002 is called the Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill.
Implementation of the NZ ETS will establish the business operations required to give effect to the government’s emissions trading policies described in The Framework for a New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme and the Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill.
The key business operations will be delivered by a group of Ministries governed by the respective chief executive officers and senior officials to ensure effective cross government integration. These functions comprise:
(a) Policy Advice: providing policy and economic advice, establishing emissions factors, developing allocation plans, undertaking international negotiations and gateway management, and management of the Crown’s obligations.
(b) Administration: providing the registry, sector administration, compliance and enforcement.
(c) Education and communications: providing the integrated delivery of information and training.
To implement these business operations, an implementation programme covering the following functions is underway:
Policy advice and co-ordination:
legislative development and statutory review:
policy and economic advice:
cross government policy co-ordination.
Emission factors:
emission factor development by sector.
Future allocation:
allocation policy and national allocation plans.
International linking:
international negotiations, cap setting, and gateway management.
Crown obligations:
purchasing Kyoto units:
buying and selling NZUs.
Education, communication, and consultation:
Management Advisory Groups:
consultation with iwi:
public consultation:
information and guidance about:
NZ ETS start up phase:
climate change policy.
Registry and sector administration:
ETS register including allocation, verification, reporting, and banking:
assessments and registration of participants and traders.
Compliance and enforcement:
monitoring compliance requirements of participants:
enforcement of compliance requirements.
Crown obligations:
purchasing and trading role of Government.
Education and communication:
public guidance about:
registry start up phase:
administration of Registry.
Communications strategy—cross government.
Education programme—cross government.
The key implementation dates over the next two years are likely to be:
20 November 2007—Bill approved by caucus and tabled in the House
December 2007—New Zealand Emissions Unit Register for Kyoto units goes live
1 January 2008—ETS obligations commence for forest land owners
1 March 2008—Carbon Accounting Standards for forests documented
1 April 2008—Draft regulations for carbon measurement, carbon certifiers and cost recovery
1 April 2008—Draft regulations for NZ ETS administration and NZU Registry operation
1 July 2008—NZ ETS Registry operational
1 July 2008—Carbon calculators available to calculate pre 1990 forest deforestation liabilities and post 1989 forest credits and liabilities
1 July 2008—Forestry Carbon Certifiers trained and able to be registered
1 July 2008—Forestry Participants with pre 1990 forests can apply for exemptions and those with post 1989 forests can apply for inclusion into the NZ ETS
31 July 2008—Forestry GIS goes live
1 December 2008—NZ ETS compliance and enforcement processes operational
1 January 2009—ETS obligations commence for liquid fossil fuel providers
30 June 2009—Deadline for applications by landowners of less than 50 hectares of pre 1990 forest land for exemptions
31 December 2009—First deforestation returns lodged with the Administrator
31 December 2009—First liquid fossil fuel emission returns lodged with the Administrator
31 December 2009—Allocation of NZUs to pre 1990 forest Participants
31 December 2009—First date for surrender of NZUs
31 December 2009—Deadline for applications by people wishing to be participants in respect of post-1989 forest land (until 1 January 2013).
The Administration role of the NZ ETS established by the Ministry of Economic Development will be reviewed by the accountable chief executives within three years of establishment (December 2010).
The NZ ETS will need to evolve to reflect changes in future international arrangements. It is also likely that ongoing refinement of the details of the ETS will be necessary as firms and administrators gain more experience of the ETS. It is therefore proposed that the NZ ETS undergo a regular policy review. The Minister responsible for the Administration of the Climate Change Response Act 2002 will be responsible for this review, examining the operation and effectiveness of the Act within 9 months of the end of each commitment period or at the end of each five year period, with the first period beginning on 1 January 2013.
Ministers and officials have undertaken an extensive engagement process with stakeholders and Maori since the release of the NZ ETS on 20 September, including:
(a) 3 cross-sector emissions trading workshops
(b) 13 regional hui
(c) A national hui for Maori
(d) 7 regional forestry meetings
(e) 4 workshops for firms that may be ‘participants’ in the ETS
(f) An NGO forum
(g) Numerous ‘one on one’ meetings with key stakeholders
(h) The establishment of a Climate Change Leadership Forum.
During engagement, a distinction was made between the “2007 decisions”
(those that pertain to items to be contained in the legislation introduced this year) and “2008 decisions”
(those decisions that will be made next year after the initial legislation is considered, including decisions about allocation within the agricultural and industrial sectors).
Feedback on the NZ ETS framework has generally been positive—in particular, many groups have vocalised their support for an emissions trading scheme over a tax. The engagement has been notable for the lack of opposition; and the all sectors, all gases approach of the NZ ETS has been well-supported. Further to this, many stakeholders are improving their knowledge of the NZ ETS proposals through the engagement process and, as a result, are becoming more interested in the workings of the scheme as opposed to being critical of the design. The major policy issues arising from engagement can be classified as follows:
(a) Allocation—the timing of possible phase-out of free allocation.
(b) Allocation—intensity compared with absolute obligations and the treatment of growth in emissions.
(c) Allocation—whether to provide assistance to firms for increases in costs associated with liquid fossil fuels (or other inputs such as wood-waste used in boilers).
(d) Unit of trade and liquidity in the market.
(e) Options for accounting for pre-1990 forests.
Allocation: timing of possible phase-out of free allocation: stakeholders from both energy-intensive industry and agriculture have expressed concern about the current proposal (phase out free allocation by 2025, starting from 2013, to be reviewed once the shape of international negotiations becomes clear). Their underlying concern is that international competitiveness will be eroded as they will face a price of carbon that many of their international competitors do not.
The signals sent around future levels of free allocation will affect investment decisions in emissions-intensive industries going forward. Yet it is important to recognise that support for one business or sector comes at a cost for the rest of the economy. It is not in New Zealand’s interests to attempt to shield certain domestic firms from the impact of imperfections in the design and coverage of the Kyoto Protocol and its successors, unless these imperfections are clearly expected to be temporary. Otherwise, New Zealand’s interests are best served by ensuring our business environment encourages growth in areas of the economy that maximise New Zealand’s economic advantages, taking into account the carbon-footprint of specific activities.
The current proposal is still the preferred approach. However, the generality of the argument is being raised with the Climate Change Leadership Forum to provide some initial thinking on different options that exist, including a more moderate phase-out and a gentle phase-out. These are discussed more in the accompanying Cabinet paper.
Allocation: intensity of absolute obligations and the treatment of growth in emissions: some stakeholders have suggested the best approach for addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns would be to adopt an intensity-based approach for key sectors, such as agriculture. Under this approach, participants would only be responsible for meeting their emissions over and above a “best practice”
benchmark level of emissions per unit of output.
This approach has not been favoured because intensity-based approaches, in addition to being administratively difficult, provide an incentive inconsistent with New Zealand’s economic signal received under the Kyoto Protocol (expressed in absolute terms). It is therefore recommended that there be no change to the proposed policy (obligations are to be on an absolute basis as opposed to intensity-basis and that growth in emissions from all sectors should face the full cost of emissions).
Allocation: assistance for increases in costs associated with liquid fossil fuels (or wood waste): a concern was raised by some sectors with a particular exposure to price increases in liquid fossil fuels (eg, tourism, fishing, and mining industries), that the assistance package does not equitably reflect cost increases throughout the economy. However, as noted above the price increase for liquid fossil fuels arising from the ETS is expected to be relatively small. Furthermore, the administrative challenge would increase significantly if assistance were to be provided for increases in costs of liquid fossil fuels, due in large to the numbers of firms potentially affected, the variable size of the firms, and the operational structures of the firms (eg, high use of contractors and external providers).
A similar concern was raised in regard to the use of wood waste as a source of fuel or an input into the production of wood products. The potential price increase for wood waste could be significant for a small number of affected firms. However, the price increase is not a direct result of the price of emission units, but rather wood waste being used as a fuel is a “second round”
response to the increase in other fuel choices (ie, coal). The valuation of the impact is therefore fraught and difficult. Coverage of assistance for “second round price increases”
such as wood waste would almost certainly mean that firms would lobby for other price increases to be covered by the assistance policy package.
Unit of trade and liquidity in the market: stakeholders expressed concerns that there may be insufficient liquidity in the New Zealand market and that firms will be poorly placed in the international carbon market, thus forcing New Zealand firms up towards the top of the price scale. Concerns have also been raised from an environmental and reputational perspective on whether there should be greater constraints on the types of units allowed into the NZ ETS, such as AAUs from Russia and the Ukraine.
It is preferable to have New Zealand firms operating effectively within the international carbon market, rather than relying on the government. Yet it is important to ensure the NZ ETS operates effectively and price-based distortions are avoided, especially in the short term. The accompanying paper recommends Cabinet consider a number of areas to assist the development of the New Zealand carbon market (underpinning this is a desire to set the rules as quickly as possible for what types of Kyoto units are able to be surrendered in the NZ ETS).
In terms of acceptability of certain AAUs into the ETS, clear trade-offs emerge. Placing no restriction on the entry of AAUs into the NZ ETS could potentially reduce the cost of compliance for New Zealand. The open nature of the NZ ETS has also been welcomed by some domestic stakeholders. No restriction would, at the very minimum, come with some reputational risk, as well as reducing the prospects of linking with other ETSs in the future. Further, to the extent that there is the ability to restrict certain AAUs from the Kyoto system in the future, allowing those units into the NZ ETS would, to some extent, undermine its environmental integrity. Although it is difficult to predict, a very large inflow of AAUs (with a resultant significant decrease in the price) appears unlikely at this stage.
One option for Cabinet to consider is clarification that under the NZ ETS, direct private sector purchases of AAUs be limited to selected jurisdictions such as the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Japan. This would effectively exclude the import of AAUs from countries where a very significant proportion of these AAUs were not generated by emission-reducing activities. This would enhance the reputation of the NZ ETS with some stakeholders and may leave open an option value to link to other ETSs in the future, but comes at a potential cost to the economy. The ability to change the list of countries from which private sector purchases of AAUs are permitted should be left open. Such an approach would leave open the possibility of government-to-government arrangements if so desired.
Options for accounting for pre-1990 forests: the proposal for assistance to owner